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/n this paper, we consider modeling knowledge bases in the multi-agent system frame work
Firstly, we show how a number of standard assumptions that are made can be expressed in
this framework. Then, a fact regarding apriori knowledge about (he external world is proved
Same results about the situation where an agent (cal/ed (he Teller) has false beliefs are
proven too.
Keywords: knowledge bases, knowledge operators, multi-agent systems, reasoning about
knowledge.
1. INTRODUCTION
The theory of multi-agent systems is described in [1], [2], [3], and [4].
Incorporating knowledge and time in multi-agent systems is given in [5] .
In this paper, we model a knowledge base (KB for short) in the framework of a
multi-agent system (MAS for short). We prove a fact regarding a priori knowledge
about the external world. We also provide some results about the situation where an
agent in the MAS (called the Teller) has false beliefs. The roles of the KB, the Teller,
and the external world will be defined in Section 3.
The paper consists of four sections and an appendix. In Section 2, we introduce the
basic notions of multi-agent systems and knowledge operators. In Section 3, we
present modeling a KB as an MAS; we state the propositions: Proposition (a priori
knowledge), Proposition (teil - know), and Proposition (belief).
Conclusions are given in Section 4. The Appendix contains proof of the
propositions mentioned above.
2. BASIC NOTIONS
In this section, we introduce basic concepts and notations.
Suppose we have a group consisting of m agents, named I, 2, .., m . We as sume
these agents wish to reason about a world that can be described in terms of a nonempty
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set P of primitive propositions. A language is just a set of forrnulas, where the set of
formulas PLK of interest to us is defined as follows:
(1) The primitive propositions in P are formulas.
(2) If F and G are formulas, then so are -,F, (FI\G), (FvG), (F ~ G), (F<=>G),
and Kj(F) for all i E {I, 2, .., m}, where K, is a moda I operator.
A Kripke structure M for an agent group {I, 2, .., m} over P is a Cm+ 2)-tuple
M = (S, I, k., k2, .. , km), where S is a set of possible worlds, I is an interpretation
that associates with eaeh world in Satruth assignment to the primitive propositions in
P, and k., k2, .. , km are binary relations on S, called the possibility relations for agents
1,2, .., m, respeetively.
Given p E P, the expression I[w](p) = true means that p is true in a world w in
a strueture M. The faet that p is false, in a world v of a structure M, is indieated by
the expression I[v ](p) = false.
The expression (u, v) E kj means that an agent i eonsiders a world v possible,
given his information in a world u. Sinee k, defines what worlds an agent i eonsiders
possible in any given world, k, will be ealled the possibility relation of the agent i.
We now define what it means for a formula to be true at a given world in a
structure.
Let (M, w) 1= F mean that F holds or is true at (M, w). The definition of 1= is
as follows:
a) (M, w) 1= P iff I[w](p) = true, where p E P
b) (M, w) 1= F 1\ G iff (M, w) 1= F and (M, w) 1= G
e) (M, w) 1= F v G iff (M, w) 1= F or (M, w) 1= G
d) (M, w) 1= F ~ G iff (M, w) 1= F implies (M, w) 1= G
e) (M, w) 1= F <=>G iff (M, w) 1= F ~ G and (M, w) 1= G ~ F
f) (M, w) 1= -,F iff (M,w) Ito F, that is, (M, w) 1= F does not hold
g) M 1= F iff (M, w) 1= F for all WES
Lastly, we shall define a modal operator K, where Kj(F) is read: Agent i knows F.
(h) (M, w) 1= Kj(F) iff (M, t) 1= F for all t E S such that (w, t) E k..
In (h) we have that an agent i knows F in a world w of a structure M exaetly
if F holds at all worlds t that the agent i considers possible in w.
Multi-agent systems
A rnulti-agent system is any collection of interacting agents. Our key assumption
here is that if we look at the system at any point in time, eaeh of the agents is in some
state. We refer to this as the agent's loeal state. We assume that an agent's loeal state
eneapsulates all the information to which the agent has aeeess. As eaeh agent has a
loeal state, it is very natural to think of the whole system as being in some (global)
state. The global state inc1udes the loeal states of the agents and the loeal state of an
environment. Aeeordingly, we divide a system into two eomponents: the environment
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and the agents, where we view the environment as everything else that is relevant.
Also, the environment can be viewed as just another agent. We need to say that a given
system can be modeled in many ways. How to divide the system into agents and
environment depends on the system being analyzed.
Let Le be a set of possible local states for the environment and let L, be a set of
possible local states for agent i, i = I, 00, n. We define G = Le x LI X .. x L" to be
the set of global states. A global state describes the system at a given point in time.
Since a system constantly changes (it is not a static entity), we are interested in how
systems change over time. We take time to range over the naturai numbers, that is, the
time domain is the set of the naturai numbers, N.
A run over G is a function r: N ~ G.
Thus, a run over G can be identified with a sequence of global states in G. The
run r represents a complete description ofhow the systems global state evolves over
time. Thus, r(O) describes the initial global state of the system in a possible execution,
r( 1) describes the next global state, and so on.
If rem) = (se, s" .., sn), then we define r[ e ](m) = Seand r[i ](m) = Sj, for i = 1,.., n.
Note that r[i](m) = Sj is the local state of agent i at the (global) state rem).
A system Rover G is a set ofruns over G. The system R models the possible
behaviors of the system being modeled.
Knowledge in multi-agent systems
We assume that we have a set P ofprimitive propositions, which we can think of
as describing basic facts about a system R. Let I be an interpretation for the
propositions in P over G, which assigns truth values to the primitive propositions at
the global states. Thus, for every p E P and SE G, I[s](p) E {true, false}.
An interpreted system IS is a pair (R, I).
Now, we define knowledge in an interpreted system IS.
Let IS = (R, I) be an interpreted system. A Kripke structure for IS, denoted by
M(IS) = (S, I, k., 00, kn), is defined in a straightforward way.
S = {rem) I rER, mEN}, that is, S is the set of the global state s at the points (r, m)
in the system R.
The possibility relations k, hoO, kn are defined as follows.
Let rem) = (se, S",,, sn), r'(m') = (se', s,' ,00, s, ') be global states in S. We say that
rem) and r'(m') are indistinguishable to an agent i iff Sj= Sj'.
Thus, the agent i has the same local state in both rem) and r'(m'). We define
kj={(r(m), r'(m')) E S X S I rem) and r'(m') are indistinguishable to the agent i}, i =
1,2, .., n.
Accordingly, (r(m), r'(m')) E k, iff Sj= Sj', i = 1,2, .., n .
There is no possibility relation ko for the environment because we are not usually
interested in what the environment knows.
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Now, it is evident what this means fora formula F in LK to be true at a state
rem) in an interpreted system IS. For instance, we have
(IS, r(m» t= p iff I[r(m)](p) = true, for all p E P.
(IS, r(m» l= Ki(F) iff(IS, r'(m'»1= F for all r'(rrr'je S such that (r(m), r(rn'j)« k..
We say that a formula F in LK is valid in an interpreted system IS, denoted IS
1=F , iff (IS, rem»~ 1=F for all rem) E S.
3. MODELING KNOWLEDGE BASES
At the multi-agent system subsection of Section 2 we said that we view any
collection of interacting agents as a multi-agent system. Informally, we can view a KB
as a system that is told facts about an extemal world, and is asked queries about that
world.
The first step in model ing the KB in the multi-agent system framework is to decide
who the agents are and what their roles are.
Formally, let MAS = (E, KB, Teller) be a multi-agent system, where agents E,
KB, and Teller are characterized as follows:
a) E is an agent that mode\s the extemal world
b) The KB is an agent (a knowledge base) that is told facts about the extemal
world
e) The Teller is an agent that tells the KB faets about the external world
The problem of modeling a KB is redueed to mode\ing the global state s of the
respeetive multi-agent system MAS.
Let rem) = (rE, rKB, rTeller) be a global state of a multi-agent system MAS = (E,
KB, Teller). We require the environment's loeal state rE to provide a eomplete
deseription of the re\evant features of the extemal world, and the KB's loeal state rKB
deseribes the information that KB has about the external world, and the Teller's loeal
state rTeller deseribes the information that the Teller has about the extemal world
and about KB.
In this way we ean distinguish what is true (as modeled by rE) from what is
known to the Teller (as model ed by rTeller) and from what KB is told (as model ed
by rKB).
Modeling so me situations
In this subseetion we foeus on model ing some simple situations (assumptions).
Then we will eonsider what happens when we weaken these assumptions. For eaeh
situation we give the appropriate model.
Situationl: the extemal world ean be described propositionalIy, using the propositions in a
finite set.
Model1: let P be a finite set of primitive propositions. The environment's state rE = I,
where I: P ~ {true, false} is a truth assignment to the primitive propositions in P.
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Situation2: the external world is stable.
Model2: Situation2 means that the truth values of the primit ive propositions P describing
the external world do not change over time, Accordingly, in each run r,
r[E](m). that is, rE(m) is independent of m .
Situation3: The Teller has complete information about the external world.
Model3: Situation3 tells us that the Teller's local state rTeller includes the truth
assignment I, that is, rTeller = (I, ..).
Situation4: KB is told and asked facts only about the external world, and not facts
about its knowledge, and these facts are express ed as propositional formulas.
Model4: KB's local state is a sequence offacts that it has been told, that is,
rKB = < FI, .., Fk >, k z I, where FI, .., Fk are propositional formulas.
Situation5: everything KB is told is true.
Model5: this situation says that in a global state
rem) = (I, < FI, .., Fk >, (I, < FI, .., Fk »), each of FI, .., Fk must be true under I,
that is, I(F I) = .. = I(Fk) = true.
Situation6: there is no a priori initial knowledge about the external world, or about
what KB will be told.
ModeI6: the first part of Situation6 is captured by assuming that the initial state
ofevery run r has the form r(O)= (I, < >, (I, < »), and that for every truth assignment
Il, there is some run rI with an initial global state riCO)= (II, < >, (I}, < »).
The second part of Situation6 is captured by not putting any further restrictions on
the set of possible runs.
All the models: Modeli, Model2, .., Model6 can be summarily captured by the
interpreted system IS = (R, 1*), where R consists of all the runs r such that for some
sequence F le •• , Fk of propositional formulas and for some truth assignment I, we
have:
KB 1. r(O) = (I, < >, (I, < >));
KB2. if rem) = (I, < F1, •• , Fk >, (I, < F" .., Fk »), then
(1) either rem + 1) = rem), or
rem + 1) = (I, <F" .., Fb Fk+1>, (I, <F1,··, Fb Fk+I>)),
(2) I(FI) = ... = I(h) = true, and
(3) I*[r(m)]=I.
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How does kb answer queries?
Suppose that at a state rem) = (rE, rKB, rTeller) KB is asked a query F, where F
is a propositional formula. Sinee KB does not have direet aeeess to the environment's
state rE, F should be interpreted not as a question about the external world, but rather
as a question about KB's knowledge of the external world.
Thus, for a query F at a state rem), KB answers Answer(KB, F, rem)), that is
defined as follows:
Answer(KB, F, rem)) =
{
Yes if (IS, rem)) F KKB (F)
No if (IS, rem)) F KKB (--,F)
I don't know otherwise
There is a question here: what exaetly doe s KB know?
It is shown in [1] that KB knows only what follows from what it has been told.
To be precise, we have the following result.
Proposition
Suppose that rem) = (I, < Fr, .., F, >, (I, < Ft, .., Fk »). Let G = F\ /\ .. /\ Fk and let
F be a propositional formula. Then the following are equivalent:
(a) IS, rem»~ F KKB (F) .
(b) G => F is a propositional tautology .
(c) M F KKB (G) => KKB (F), where M eonsists of all Kripke struetures where
the possibility relations ki are equivalenee relations.
A priori knowledge
Situation 6 (there is no a priori initial knowledge about the external world, or
about what KB will be told) is eaptured by the interpreted system IS = (R, 1*), where
R eonsists of all runs r that satisfy KB 1 and KB2. We now eonsider a situation
where there may be a priori knowledge.
Situation (a priori knowledge): there is a default rule saying that if G is true, then
it is the first fact KB is told.
Model (apriori knowledge): a default rule says that
DR: (for all rER )(for all n e N)[ if r(n) = (I, < F\, .., Fk >, (I, < F), .., Fk ») and
k ~ 1 and I(G) = true, then F\ = G] holds.
We now state the following interesting result:
Proposition (a priori knowledge)
If (for some k ~ I )[ rem) = (I, < Fr, .., F, >, (I, < F\, .., Fk -» /\F\ '* G ], then
(IS, rem»~F= KKB (--,G) , under the condition that the default rule DR holds.
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This proposition says that if we as sume a priori knowledge given by the default
rule DR, then KB knows -.G.
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
Let us consider the following situation:
Situation (incomplete information): the Teller does not have complete information
about the external world though it still has complete information about KB.
Model (incomplete information): we model this situation by incJuding in the Teller's local
state rTeller a nonempty set T of truth assignments. T represents the set of possible
external worlds that the Teller considers possible. We require lET (because we are
focusing on knowledge); this means that the true extemal world is one of the Teller's
possibilities. The Teller's state also includes the sequence of facts that KB has been told.
Accordingly, rTeller = (I, < F" .., Fk >, (T, < F" .., Fk »), where lET.
False beliefs
Up to now, we have assumed that the actual world (represented by an
interpretation I) is one of the worlds in T. lt is interesting to consider the implication
of allowing the Teller to have false beliefs.
Situation (false beliefs): The Teller has false beliefs and tells F to KB only if F is true.
Model (false beliefs): The Teller's local state rTeller has the form rTeller = (I, < F" .., Fj>,
(T, < Ft, .., Fk»), wherewe allow I not to be in T.
In addition, (for all I, E T)[ I,(Fd = ..= I,(Fk) = true].
The possibility relation kT for the Teller is defined in the following way.
Let rem) = (rE, rKB, rTeller), r,(m,) = (r l E, rIKB, rITelIer) be arbitrary states. Then
(r(m), r,(m,)) E kT iff
(1) rem) and rl(ml) are indistinguishable to the Teller, that is, rTeller = r!Teller,
and
(2) if rl(ml) = (I, < F" .., F, >, (T, < F" .., F, »), then lET.
This definition of kT means that the only worlds that the Teller considers possible are the
ones corresponding to its beliefs as captured by T.
Proposition (tell-know)
If the Teller tells G to KB at state rem), then (IS, rem») 1=KT(G) .
Proposition (tell-know) state s that if the Teller tells G to KB at state r(m).
then the Teller knows G.
109
Proposition (belief)
The Knowledge Axiom KT(G) => G does not hold.
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The Teller's knowledge (defined by kT) is in fact the Teller's belief. Namely, the
Knowledge Axiom KT(G) => G does not hold. This is characterized in the following
proposition.
4. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered model ing knowledge bases in the multi-agent system
framework. We have shown how a number of standard situations can be modeled in
this framework. As we have seen, this has given us a number of advantages. For one
thing, we have described assumptions about how KB obtains its knowledge. We have
also been able to relate what KB has been told to what is true in the world. We have
also modeled the situations where the Teller has incomplete information and where
the Teller has false beliefs. We have stated a fact regarding a priori knowledge
(Proposition (a priori knowledgej); also, we have stated two resuits concerning the
situation where the Teller has false beliefs (Proposition (tell-know) and Proposition
(belief). The Appendix contains pro of of the propositions mentioned above.
APPENDIX
Proof (Proposition (a priori knowledge)
Assume DR: (for all rER )(for all n e N)[ if r(n) = (I,<F [,.., Fk >, (I,<F I,.., F, >))
and k ~ 1 and I(G) = true, then F I = G] holds. Also as sume A: (for some state
r(m» [r(m) = (I, < F[, .., Fk >, (I, < F[, .., F, ») /\ FI ;/;G ]. We would like to show that
(IS, rem)) 1= KKB( --,G) .
Let r'(m') E S be an arbitrary state in S such that (r(m), r'(m')) E kKB. We have
to show (IS, r'(m'j) 1= --,G. From DR and A it follows that I[r(m)](G) = false.
Because (r(m), r'(m') E kKB ,that is, r'(m') = (I', < F[, .., F, >, (I', < F[, .., Fk -»
and because FI;/; G, we obtain l'[r'(m')](G) = false. Therefore, (IS, r'(m')) 1= --,G. It
follows that (IS, rem)) 1= KKB( --,G), as desired.
Proof (Proposition (tell-know)
Because the Teller teil s G to KB at the state rem), it follows (for all I E T)[
I[r(m)](G) = true]. We would like to prove (IS, rem)) 1= KT(G).
Let r'(m') E S be an arbitrary state such that (r(m), r'(rn') E kT. Since r'(m') = (I',
< F[, .., G >, (T, < F[, .., G »), we have I' E T, that is, l'[r'(m')](G) = true.
Therefore, (IS, r'(rn') 1= G. It follows that (IS, rem»~ 1= KT(G), as we wanted to
show all along.
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Proof (Proposition (beliefj)
Assume B: rem) = (1', < F" .., G >, (T, < F" .., G >)) and I' ~ T, where
I'[r(m)](G) = false. From B it follows (IS, rem)) It G. Because the Teller tells G
to KB at state rem), we obtain (from Proposition (tell-know)) that (IS, rem)) 1=
KT(G) holds. Accordingly, (IS, rem)) F KT(G) => G does not hold.
We are grateful to the anonymous referees for their careful reading and useful
comments.
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VIŠEAGENTNI SUSTAVI: MODELIRANJE BAZA ZNANJA
Sažetak
U ovom članku razmatrali smo modeliranje baza znanja u okviru višeagentnih sustava Prvo,
pokazali smo kako se neke standardne pretpostavke o bazi znanja izražavaju u ovom okviru.
Poslije toga, dokazali smo činjenicu koja se odnosi na apriorno znanje o vanjskom svijetu.
Također, dokazali smo neke rezultate o pogrešnom vjerovanju agenta (zvanog Teller).
Ključne riječi: baze znanja, operatori znanja, višeagentni sustavi, rezoniranje o znanju.
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